Alex Kirk(Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team)

Setting The Evil Bit: Malicious Traffic Hiding In Plain Sight

Building on the research I presented at You Sh0t the Sheriff in May, this presentation will explore ways to detect traffic generated by malware-infected hosts in a broad, generic fashion - instead of looking for traits specific to a given piece or family of malware. Specifically, my talk will explore: * HTTP protocol breakage - much of the HTTP traffic generated by compromised hosts ignores or violates key parts of the RFCs, breaking the protocol in ways worse than even Internet Explorer 6. * Legal WTFs - other times, malware generates traffic that is technically legal per the RFCs, but simply makes no sense in the real world. This includes items such as POSTs to image URIs, blatantly malicious User-Agent strings (i.e. "GBot/2.3"), mismatches between declared Content-Types and actual data returned, etc. * Spam blasts - after realizing that the hosts in my malware zoo have been blacklisted at all the major mail providers, I\'ve set up an outbound mail honeypot to make sure all of that traffic is captured as well. Techniques for detection ranging from simple flow analysis on port 25 to inspection of SMTP headers and bodies will be based on this new data. * General "Ha Ha" - malware does ridiculous things all the time, and the presentation will be full of the funniest and most ludicrous examples I can find from my malware zoo.

Sobre Alex Kirk

Alex Kirk is a senior researcher with the Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team (VRT), and the head of that group's Awareness, Education, Guidance, and Intelligence Sharing (AEGIS) program, which is designed to increase direct collaboration between Sourcefire customers, the Snort user community, and the VRT in the interests of improved detection and coverage. In his 7 years with the VRT, Alex has become one of the world's leading experts on Snort rules, and has honed skills in reverse engineering, network traffic analysis, and systems security. He recently contributed a pair of Snort-related chapters to "Practical Intrusion Analysis: Prevention and Detection for the Twenty-First Century" and is a regular contributor to the widely-read VRT blog (http://vrt-blog.snort.org/). His current major technical project at Sourcefire involves automated collection of network data generated by malicious binaries, and analysis of that data for detection purposes.

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